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Hospitality,	or	Kant’s	Critique	of	
Cosmopolitanism	and	Human	Rights	
 
On one prominent view of global justice, all humankind is tied by moral bonds to care for 
a cosmopolitan society spanning the entire globe. Duties of justice to individuals do not end at 
borders but include positive obligations to secure a potentially expansive list of human rights of 
persons everywhere, perhaps including care for their material welfare, and this may require 
international action or intervention when one cannot rely on local governments. On a second, 
less sanguine view, most of this is nothing but a recipe for permanent war. Because the sole 
legitimate aim of international politics is avoiding war whenever possible, the only valid casus 
belli is the violation or threatened violation of one state’s sovereignty by another. Enforcement 
of human rights is an internal matter for states, and any peremptory rights of stateless persons or 
individuals across borders must be limited as narrowly as possible to ensure they could never 
invite new conflicts by competing with state sovereignty. Above all, any positive claims of 
justice grounded in membership in a world community, beyond the most minimal injunction 
against waging war at will on foreigners, must be relegated to the dustbin of history as among the 
greatest obstacles to lasting peace. In the world we inhabit, such claims can only provide pretexts 
for powers keen to rationalize self-interested belligerence by dressing it up in the sanctimonious 
language of philanthropy. 
Now Kant’s theory of what we may loosely call international politics is often presented 
as a more or less distinctive version of the first view. But in fact his view was the second, and the 
first that of thinkers he opposed. Too often Kant is read on the presumption that the major choice 
in politics is whether to stand on the side of principle, reason, and morality or instead with realist 
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critics such as Hobbes or Schmitt. But this obscures the originality of Kant’s views: in fact he 
made a point of defending a third alternative, one unshaken by Hobbes’ radical critique just 
because it took that critique explicitly as its own point of departure, but which nevertheless went 
on to defend a role for principles of justice also beyond state borders as a further part of a 
solution to the problem of a war of all against all. The stakes in this concern more than Kant 
interpretation, moreover, because if I am right, then Kant advanced a powerful alternative to an 
all-too familiar forced choice between moralism and immoralism in international politics. 
This article considers one major piece of Kant’s solution—his novel category of 
“cosmopolitan right” [Weltbürgerrecht], which he limited to the single right of “hospitality” 
[Hospitalität, Wirthbarkeit]. There is no agreement in the literature on what this right of 
hospitality entails or how Kant’s brief discussions purport to justify it. The key, I will show, is to 
see that when Kant formulated hospitality as a right “that it not be justified to be met as an 
enemy” or “not to be treated as an enemy” simply for arriving on foreign shores with offers of 
trade, he was joining a centuries-long argument in the law of nations over who counts as an 
“enemy” who may be justly repelled or conquered in war.1 Contrary to what is almost 
universally supposed, the point of this for Kant was not to secure a positive right to anything, but 
simply to rule out familiar justifications for declaring others “enemies” and thereby overriding 
their provisional rights—holding already in the state of nature—to defend themselves and their 
possessions from attack. A contrary interpretation of the “sacred right of hospitality” had been 
invoked, famously, by thinkers including Vitoria and Grotius precisely to justify colonial wars in 
pursuit of commerce, and Kant’s reworking drew on Vattel’s criticisms of those predecessors on 
just this point, while regrounding the right, in sharp contrast to Vattel, as a solution to Hobbes’ 
problem of how to escape the state of nature.2 
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On this view, Kant’s theory of right may be summarized as follows. In the state of nature, 
provisional, “private right” sanctions defense of oneself and one’s property, but because 
interpretation and enforcement are left to individuals a condition of controversy and general war 
ensues that must be left behind. First this is solved at the domestic level through a sovereign state 
(ideally with a certain constitution), then at the interstate level by means of a pacific federation. 
But this still leaves a state of nature among states and non-state peoples, which was a major 
concern in Kant’s eighteenth century, when much of the world was widely held to live outside 
states and great power politics was closely bound up with wars over extra-European colonies, 
notably in the French and Indian or Seven Years’ War of 1754-63, and again in the American 
Revolution a few years later. This is what Kant’s cosmopolitan right was meant to solve. Rather 
than resolving conflict through public enforcement, as in the state, Kant opted here for no 
enforcement at all: his right of hospitality was framed just so that it could never be invoked to 
start a new war in the name of pursuing one’s rights. The rights to freedom and property enjoyed 
by non-state peoples already in the state of nature will disallow colonial conquest and plunder 
unless it could be shown that locals had injured foreign traders, thereby rendering themselves 
“enemies” open to just retaliation. And this is just what Kant’s right of hospitality rules out 
(while also ruling out wars against traders who remain peaceful). In this way, cosmopolitan right 
provides the third and final layer of a system of public right designed as a comprehensive 
alternative to a global state of war. 
Most interpreters of Kant’s cosmopolitan right see in it instead a source of positive 
obligations independent of the logic of controversy that gives rise to the need for sovereign 
states, and go on to associate Kant’s arguments with expansive projects of institutionalizing 
cosmopolitan or human rights.3 Some recent work has pushed back by emphasizing Kant’s debts 
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to Hobbes or Rousseau or his call for limiting cross-border rights more narrowly than prior 
theorists, as part of a critique of colonialist war.4 But this has so far left a muddle over the 
meaning and justification of his right of hospitality. Tuck is one of few to appreciate the full 
force of Kant’s famous criticism of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel as “only sorry comforters” 
(8:355), but he takes this to imply, against the text, that Kant thought cosmopolitanism as 
hospitality merely “desirable” rather than “necessary.”5 I argue, by contrast, that Kant’s 
cosmopolitan right was meant precisely as the final piece of a solution to the problem of right in 
controversy he took over from Hobbes—but it was none the less for that a genuine principle of 
public right meant to show why Hobbes’ state of nature beyond state borders was not, in fact, 
inescapable. 
Perhaps one reason this has been so difficult for commentators to pin down is that few are 
similarly comfortable with both Kant’s critical philosophical logic and the centuries-long 
tradition of the law of nations with which he engaged.6 The first section of this article thus 
situates Kant’s intervention against the background of divergent eighteenth-century approaches 
to the law of nations or ius gentium. The next deepens this background with a very condensed 
overview of a few of the most relevant controversies in the longer ius gentium tradition reaching 
back to ancient Rome and through its radical reformulation in the early modern period. The third 
section explains in detail Kant’s right of hospitality and the argument he offered in its favor. In 
this article I do not try to defend Kant’s views or to consider how they might need to be adjusted 
for today’s world. What I mean to show is that his position is different than has widely been 
supposed. It is a powerful view that has not received the attention it deserves and which still 
demands a response today. 
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Kant and the Ius Gentium Tradition 
There is no doubt that Kant saw his writings on international politics as interventions in 
long-running debates over the “law of nations” [ius gentium, droit des gens, Völkerrecht]. The 
Metaphysics of Morals gave “ius gentium” as a synonym for Kant’s own Völkerrecht (6:311), 
and when Kant lectured on natural law twelve times between 1767 and 1788, he used the fifth 
edition of Gottfried Achenwall’s Ius naturae in usum auditorum, the latter volume comprising 
“ius familiae, ius publicum et ius gentium” (Göttingen, 1763).7 The only surviving notes from 
these lectures, from 1784, end with a section on the “jus gentium” where Kant suggested that 
although “this law has not yet been brought under general principles… the best book to read on it 
is Vattel’s Les droits des gens” in the 1760 German translation by Johann Philipp Schulin—one 
of the relatively few books in his personal library when he died (27:1392).8 Kant famously 
contrasted his view of international politics to that he attributed indiscriminately to “Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Vattel” in Perpetual Peace (8:355), although there is no clear evidence he had 
read the first two. He likely knew Leibniz’s Codex iuris gentium diplomaticus (first ed. 
Hannover, 1693), as he appears to have lifted from it the joke that opens Perpetual Peace. And 
although it is possible that his knowledge of the Roman civil law tradition was second-hand, in a 
lecture of the early 1770s he described the Corpus iuris civilis, the sixth-century CE compilation 
of Roman law from which the later ius gentium tradition derives, as “certainly the greatest and 
surest evidence of the profundity of human thought” and referred to the apocryphal 1137 
rediscovery of the Digest at Amalfi as “the best find among books that humankind ever could 
have made” (24.181).9 
Kant’s intervention was to bring together in a novel and systematic way certain lines of 
thought in two competing eighteenth-century approaches to the questions of ius gentium and just 
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war theory. One line had begun with Hobbes’ radical insistence that the state of nature was a 
state of war of all against all, and that the first command of justice was therefore to leave it—
“exeundum esse ex statu naturali,” in the mantra Kant explicitly attributed to Hobbes and never 
tired of repeating.10 Rousseau followed Hobbes in rejecting natural sociability as a ground for 
law independent of a sovereign will, but he proposed a way out of Hobbes’ state of nature among 
nations by adapting the Abbé St-Pierre’s plan for a permanent pan-European society to provide 
for mutual security.11 Kant followed Rousseau (with some adjustments) in responding to the 
problem of war by seeking to establish certain relations among sovereign political institutions, 
rather than by appealing directly to the authority of any freestanding law of nature and nations. 
The latter was the approach of the mainstream modern ius gentium tradition, from 
Grotius and Pufendorf in the seventeenth century down to Barbeyrac, Wolff, Burlamaqui, and 
Vattel, among others, in the eighteenth. I consider Pufendorf the real founder of this 
philosophical approach to the “law of nature and nations”, because he built on Grotius in a 
specific direction that incorporated a good deal of Hobbes, notably the emphasis on sovereignty, 
while simultaneously purporting to escape the amoralist implications of Hobbes’ own view by 
repurposing the notion of natural human sociability as a solution to the alleged lack of an agreed 
principle of justice in the state of nature.12 Kant very clearly sided with the Hobbes-Rousseau 
line against the Pufendorf-Vattel line on the central issue of the inadequacy of just war theory 
appealing directly to universal law, which depended on deriving the obligation to obey that law 
from the sociability of human nature or the authority of divine command. 
But Pufendorf also made another key move, breaking with the line of argument from 
Vitoria to Grotius that violations of this law of nations constitute “injuries” justifying coercive 
retribution—paradigmatically in the case of native Americans, whose purported refusal to honor 
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a ius gentium obligation to allow free access to European traders was held to justify colonial 
conquest. Pufendorf drew a clear distinction under the law of nations between “perfect” duties, 
pertaining to “justice”, and “imperfect” duties of mere “humanity or love”, and insisted that only 
violations of the former justify the use of force whereas the latter oblige solely in foro interno 
(3.4.1).13 Duties to commerce are imperfect (unless one makes them perfect by consenting to a 
contract or treaty), and therefore foreigners may never claim a right of commerce or hospitality 
against us “without our permission and against our will” (3.3.9). This distinction would become 
canonical through Wolff to Vattel, who rearticulated it as a right to petition for trade but not to 
demand it: “each nation… will accept or refuse what is proposed to it by foreigners, without 
them being able to accuse her of injustice, or to demand from her a reason, much less to make 
use of compulsion” since “the obligation of commerce with other nations is in itself only 
imperfect.”14 Thus, Vattel concluded, “When the Spaniard attacked the Americans on the pretext 
that those peoples refused commerce with him, he [only sought to] cover with a vain color his 
own insatiable cupidity” (2.2.25).15 Kant’s right of hospitality makes essentially the same point. 
The difference is that in the Pufendorf-Vattel line this still depended on the direct authority of a 
law of nations derived partly from the law of nature and partly from the presumed general 
agreement of peoples. What Kant saw was that the same principle of hospitality could be 
reworked, quite to the contrary, as part of a solution to the Hobbesian problem of conflict 
unleashed by the natural right of each to every thing. That problem had been addressed at other 
levels by means of states (with Rousseau’s reworking of Hobbes) and the pacific interstate 
federation (with Rousseau’s reworking of St-Pierre), but had remained unresolved in relations 
involving non-state peoples.
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Kant, then, made four key moves vis-à-vis the mainstream ius gentium tradition. He first 
sided with its fiercest critics in rejecting the attempt to ground a binding universal law of nations 
in human nature, divine will, or a presumption of general assent. That project had been an effort 
post factum to build a systematic and rational foundation underneath a mishmash of traditional 
legal precepts accumulated and handed down for centuries around the core of Roman civil law. 
But Kant rejected as philosophically incoherent any of the sorts of foundations proposed by 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural lawyers. Whereas the just war tradition in the law of 
nations proposed rules governing the rightful conduct of war in a state of nature, Kant followed 
Hobbes and Rousseau in insisting that the first command of justice was to leave that state for a 
civil one in which problems of controversy and enforcement could be solved through the 
construction of a sovereign power. This offered itself as a solution to the longstanding problem 
of how external law can bind, since on the (hypothetical) supposition of an original contract, the 
rights of the sovereign can be seen as conferred by consent of the governed. But it also appeared 
to undercut the basis of any law of nations beyond state borders. 
Kant then made a second move. He reformulated the object of traditional “Völkerrecht” 
to solving a residual Hobbesian problem left over after the formation of states, since “a state of 
nature among nations, like a state of nature among human beings, is a condition that one ought to 
leave in order to enter a lawful condition” (6:350, cf. 8:354). Despite disagreement over how 
exactly this argument went, it is clear that Kant concluded by endorsing a version of Rousseau’s 
pacific federation as a solution to the problem of ius controversum (or right in controversy) at the 
interstate level. This effectively redefined Völkerrecht in two parts: first, the demand to enter the 
federation, and second (in the Doctrine of Right), those rules for the legitimate conduct of war 
where no such federation yet obtained. These rules, however, no longer appealed to any 
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freestanding universal law for distinguishing just from unjust wars in a state of nature. Instead 
they derived strictly from those logical conditions that must be observed if escaping the state of 
nature by building a universal pacific federation were to remain possible: an “unjust enemy” was 
now simply one whose expressed will “reveals a maxim by which, if it were made a universal 
rule, any condition of peace among nations would be impossible and, instead, a state of nature 
would be perpetuated” (6:349). Or already in his 1784 lectures: “the ius gentium is simply the 
possibility of a federation of nations” (27:1393). Again this provided a clear answer to why the 
law should bind, independent of any controversial theory of human nature or divine will. But this 
answer supported only those elements of the traditional law of nations governing interstate 
relations, whereas the tradition had covered a much broader range of relations including those 
with individual foreigners and non-state peoples. Kant’s redefinition of the law of nations with 
Hobbes and Rousseau thus had the effect, in changing its basis, of paring back its content: 
henceforth “Völkerrecht” properly understood ought to mean nothing but “ius publicum 
civitatum” (the public law of states, 6:343). 
This, however, would seem to leave no basis for principles governing relations with non-
state peoples. And so Kant made a third move, introducing the novel category of “cosmopolitan 
right”. The commonplace that this represented a revolutionary extension of right to individuals 
independent of state membership could hardly be further from the truth.16 Ius gentium applied to 
individuals already in ancient Rome, and although the suggestion that it specifically concerned 
interstate relations had gained ground since Francisco Suárez first proposed it in 1612, the ius 
gentium right of commerce or hospitality that Kant retained had become a central element of the 
law nations with Vitoria and remained so down to Wolff and Vattel.17 So in coining the new term 
“Weltbürgerrecht”, Kant did not extend the scope of the law of nations at all, he only salvaged a 
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single very familiar piece of it which otherwise would have been entirely lost with the way he 
had redefined the traditionally more inclusive term “Völkerrecht”. Indeed, Kant insisted most 
explicitly on “limiting” (not extending) cosmopolitan right to that single right of hospitality, by 
which he can only have meant to rule out appeals to any further ius gentium rights—such as 
familiar ones to aid in necessity or protection from one’s own prince, to pass armies through 
others’ territory, or particularly to demand freedom of trade—any of which would threaten to 
reignite the sort of ius controversum his entire strategy was designed to escape. 
Kant’s fourth and final move was to redefine this right of hospitality, keeping the irenic 
substance of the version in the line from Pufendorf to Vattel while reframing it no longer as a 
freestanding positive entitlement in a state of nature, but to the contrary as a condition of the 
possibility of a lawful state that would leave behind that of the bellum omnium contra omnes. In 
other words, Kant’s aim was not to add new rights, but to reformulate the traditional law of 
nations strictly on the basis of a demand for peace compatible with the consent of all subject to 
law, thereby providing an answer to long-running debates over its valid sources and the authority 
of competing claims to interpret and enforce it. The resulting cosmopolitan right and law of 
nations together added up to a narrower band of rights than the Völkerrecht they replaced. And 
that was much of the point—to rule out any additional rights of the sort routinely used to justify 
wars. 
This is what I mean in saying that Kant offered a “critique”—in his distinctive sense—of 
cosmopolitanism and human rights, even though he identified his project with both terms. In 
each case, he insisted on defining the term in a sense narrower than that it replaced, to avoid 
overstepping the bounds of what in it could actually be proven obligatory. By reflecting on the 
conditions of possibility of binding external law per se, Kant thought one could arrive at a 
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demand for perpetual peace, and from that for the need first for states, then a pacific federation, 
and finally the right of hospitality. Everything in the law of nature and nations that could not be 
justified this way, as a response to the Hobbesian problem of right in controversy, had to be 
thrown out. But what was left was secured from skepticism toward other sorts of justifications 
that had to rely on conformity to custom, the benevolence of human nature, or the fear of God. 
What was radical in Kant’s view was that rather than papering over the problem of disagreement 
over justice he redefined the content of justice itself by reflecting on the logical conditions of any 
non-question-begging solution to the disagreement. To suggest instead that what distinguished 
his position was that it gave individuals more rights is both to miss the point of critique, here, for 
Kant and to get the history the wrong way around.  
A Very Brief Overview of the Ius Gentium Tradition 
Ius gentium was originally a category of Roman law contrasted to the civil law peculiar 
to Rome because taken to apply to all peoples. One usage, reported in Sallust, Livy, Seneca, and 
Tacitus, inter alia, covered sacred obligations enjoining rules for initiating war, as well as 
protecting legates and honoring treaties.18 But another sense, more prominent among jurists, 
referred to a body of private law developed by the praetor peregrinus from 242 BCE, once the 
Roman republic had incorporated its Italian neighbors. Whereas ius civile was restricted to 
Roman citizens, ius gentium was available also to regulate commerce and resolve disputes 
involving non-citizens, or peregrini.19 The extension of citizenship to all free male Roman 
subjects in 212 CE deprived the category of its rationale, but the term survived and the 
relationship among natural law, the law of nations, and civil law remained controversial for 
centuries. The oldest surviving references to “ius gentium” are in Cicero (though see Gellius 
6.3.45), who distinguished it from the ius civile proper to Rome (Rep. 1.2), identifying it both 
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with unwritten custom (Part. §129) and the law of nature (Tusc. 1.13, Off. 3.23), proper, 
according to Stoics, to a universal society of all with all (Off. 3.69).  
The most important definitions are found in the Corpus iuris civilis, compiled in the sixth 
century CE under the Emperor Justinian, which became the standard text of Roman law by the 
twelfth century and set the terms for subsequent debates. But despite the project’s avowed 
synthetic aims, its cited authorities did not agree. Gaius closely identified ius gentium with 
natural law accessible to reason: “The law which a people constitutes for itself is particular to its 
polity and is called ius civile... but that which natural reason constitutes among all human beings 
is equally observed by all and is called ius gentium, as that law used by all nations [gentes]” (D. 
1.1.9 = Gaius 1.1.1). Ulpian instead took the two for contraries: “Natural law is what nature 
teaches all animals, for this law [impelling procreation and the upbringing of young] is not 
peculiar to the human race” whereas the law of nations is “common only to human beings among 
themselves” (D. 1.1.1.3-4). And the Institutes, following Hermogenian (D. 1.1.5), contrasted the 
origin of the law of nations in historical human acts to the eternal law of nature:  
The law of nations is common to the entire human race, for nations established certain 
laws for themselves as occasion and human necessities required. For wars arose, and 
captivities and slavery followed, which are contrary to the law of nature (since by the law 
of nature all men are originally born free). Also, from this law nearly all contracts were 
introduced, such as of purchase and sale, leasing and hiring, partnership, deposits, loans 
redeemable in kind, and innumerable others (1.2). 
There was more agreement on the content of ius gentium than on its definition: it was generally 
accepted that it governed war, property, contracts, and particularly slavery.20 
Two things ought to strike a modern reader. First is that in Rome much of the law of 
nations was private law applying directly to individuals. Although it covered laws of war and 
embassies, among its central institutions were also property, commerce, and slavery. No Roman 
jurist distinguished ius gentium from other law because it applied to states rather than to 
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individuals; the point was rather that unlike ius civile it applied not only to Roman citizens but to 
everyone, and disagreements over its relation to natural law turned on explaining how that might 
be so. The second point is that ius gentium was one of several sorts of law internal to the Roman 
legal system, developed and applied by Roman institutions. The various stories told about its 
sources were attempts to rationalize this system from inside, to minimize ambiguities and 
contradictions in inherited law with the practical aim of resolving disputes among persons 
subject to Roman power—they were not attempts to shore up the authority of Roman power in 
the first place. One presumed a right to rule over a pre-existing political community in 
accordance with law and asked how that law should be interpreted. One worried about resolving 
conflicts of jurisdiction internal to that complex community, but not with justifying the authority 
of the law in general or the power to enforce it up to or beyond any sort of external territorial 
bound. This point is essential, because the survival of the Corpus iuris and its revival from the 
end of the eleventh century meant that down through the late medieval period these assumptions 
would outlive the actual Roman political institutions within which they had originally made 
sense. It was only in the early modern period, particularly after the discovery of the Americas, 
that they fell into crisis and the entire framework linking natural law, the law of nations, and civil 
law would be rethought on radically new foundations. 
In the medieval period, the Roman law of the Corpus iuris was variously overlaid with 
both Christian doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy, the latter taken to document precepts of 
right reason, and further developed by glossators in the two parallel traditions of canon and civil 
law. Law developed for use in ancient Roman institutions was adapted to the needs of very 
different institutions that had emerged in their wake, including princes bound by ties of fealty 
and the two putatively universal societies of the Holy Roman Empire and the Church. But 
	 14	
despite differences, for instance, between the thoroughgoing rationalism of Aquinas and the 
qualified conventionalism of the leading fourteenth-century jurist Bartolus of Sassoferato, both 
continued to presume the universal authority of an inherited law of nations built syncretically on 
the Corpus iuris. Characteristically, when Bartolus famously argued for the de facto 
independence of Italian city-states from the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire, he made his 
case not by contesting the universal authority of a common Roman law, but by citing that law’s 
own precepts on how imperium might be lost.21 
This shared framework fell into crisis in the early modern period as the discovery of the 
Americas, the rise of a skeptical humanism first in the Italian city-states, and then the 
Reformation conspired to undercut the authority of universal Church and Empire. The tradition 
had understood itself as the living law of a real and universal community under a continuous 
authority that had been transferred from the ancient Byzantine Empire to the Holy Roman via the 
Pope.22 As this assumption collapsed in the early modern period, the Roman law, including the 
law of nations, was left hanging in the air. 
For the first time, the central, if only sometimes explicit, question for natural lawyers 
became how to have universal law without universal empire. This forced the issue of the 
authority basis of the inherited Roman law, and particularly of its parts claiming universal status 
as laws of nature and nations. The Americas drove the point home: not only did they raise the 
question of what spiritual authority a Christian Pope might claim over non-Christians, they raised 
an even thornier parallel question concerning what jurisdiction Roman law might have over 
peoples who had never been ruled by Rome and of whose very existence the Romans had been 
utterly unaware. In the first phase of a response in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
authors of the second scholastic, beginning with Cajetan and Vitoria, flatly rejected claims to 
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world dominion by Emperor and Pope and creatively reworked specific arguments from within 
the Thomist tradition to make up the difference.23 Notably, it was only at this time that ius 
gentium was first systematically distinguished, by Suárez in 1612, from ius naturale and civile as 
that species of law applying specifically to states or nations in their external relations, rather than 
to the individuals inside them. 
In a second phase, a strand of thought I call “humanist radicals”24—preeminently Gentili, 
Grotius, and Hobbes—proposed various ways of excising the Thomism and Aristotelianism of 
the scholastic synthesis and supplanting it with a new framework that might stand on its own 
without the need of support from theology or the continuous authority of a historical legal 
community. As Gentili put it in 1598 in De iure belli libri tres: “the law written in the books of 
Justinian is not merely that of the civitas [i.e. Rome], but also that of nations and of nature; and it 
is so adapted to universal nature, that if the Empire were destroyed and the law itself long buried, 
it would still rise and diffuse itself among all the nations of mankind” (1.3.26). 
But disagreements soon surfaced, raising a second issue. Medieval commentators could 
be syncretic because so long as membership in a continuous community under law was 
presupposed, diverse sources of evidence and modes of reasoning could be presumed to 
complement each other as alternate routes for arriving at the same, underlying truth about what 
that law said. But when this assumption broke down and theorists began repurposing different 
sorts of arguments and evidence to establish the authority of law in the first place, it eventually 
became clear that conclusions might diverge. Scripture might not line up with philosophical 
reason, or the history of usage with either. 
A third phase of response to the crisis began when the post-scholastic radicals divided 
into three broad camps over the course of the seventeenth century. In the last section we 
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encountered the first, rationalist (and decidedly Protestant) line that ran from Pufendorf to Vattel. 
Grotius and Hobbes had attempted to reconstruct the law of nature or nations on a rational basis 
broadly more geometrico. But each also kept one foot in a humanist culture they shared with 
Gentili, freely mixing logical argument with rhetorical appeals.25 Pufendorf retrospectively 
claimed Grotius’s mantle by emphasizing his ambition to logical system and purporting to carry 
it further, and by the eighteenth century Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, Wolff, Vattel and their 
followers had made good on Pufendorf’s ambition to establish a philosophically grounded school 
in “the law of nature and nations” to supplant the scholastic tradition, claiming Grotius as its 
founder.26 This approach claimed to underwrite the authority of ius gentium by closely tying it to 
natural law, and that of natural law by purporting to derive it systematically from a small number 
of principles of human nature (typically natural drives to self-preservation, society and the 
perfection of the rational faculties). Treaties and custom provided additional sources of the law 
of nations within the constraints of natural law. But authors disagreed sharply over a fourth 
category of the “voluntary law of nations” coined by Grotius to describe positive law sanctioned 
by the will of “all or most” nations.27 Pufendorf and Barbeyrac called this a chimera, whereas 
Wolff reinterpreted it as derived from the will of a global “civitas maxima” to which all nations 
were bound by nature to submit, concluding that since it was impossible for all nations actually 
to assemble, right reason must derive the “voluntary” law from the purpose of the association 
itself, taken for what the will of all nations would be bound to agree.28 Vattel rejected Wolff’s 
fiction of submission to a global common will, grounding the “voluntary” law in a natural 
“society of nations” premised to the contrary on reciprocal respect for the independent judgment 
of sovereign states.29 All these authors hoped to save the ius gentium from the collapse of the 
Roman law by grounding it in a rationally reconstructed law of nature, but their running 
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disagreement over the relation of this “law of nature and nations” to positive law reflected the 
gap opened up between law and politics without the mediating institutions of universal Church 
and Empire. 
A second line of thought, more directly pitched to diplomatic practice, took the simpler 
tack of collapsing ius gentium entirely into the positive law of compact and custom. This turned 
attention to compiling treaties and chronicling historical events as evidence of sovereigns 
assenting to general rules of conduct. Leibniz, interestingly, was the pioneer in this, and by the 
late eighteenth century, a consensus came to predominate in this school that the law of nations 
once supposed universal held in fact only among the nations of Europe, which were united by 
certain shared customs (notably having rejected slavery as the outcome of wars amongst 
Christians).30 Distinctions between the rationalist and positivist camps were often muddy, 
however, because many eighteenth-century accounts freely combined natural law and positive 
sources without worrying overmuch about their philosophical relations.31 
We have also already encountered the third major line of thought in the period, that 
running from Hobbes to Rousseau. Instead of presuming the authority of universal law and 
arguing over its sources and methods of interpretation, this tack began with the political question 
of legitimate legislative authority. In the international case, Rousseau reworked St-Pierre’s plan 
for perpetual peace, in Hobbes’ language, as a solution to the problem of how to escape the state 
of nature among states. How had it taken so long, Rousseau asked, to see “that each of us being 
in a civil state with our fellow citizens and in a state of nature with all the rest of the world, we 
have only prevented wars among individuals to kindle from them general wars, which are a 
thousand times more terrible” and which might be prevented only by a “form of confederative 
government that, uniting Peoples by ties similar to those that unite individuals, submit equally 
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one and the other to the authority of the Laws”?32 Otherwise, as he wrote in an unpublished 
manuscript, “as for what one calls the law of nations, it is certain that, without a sanction, its 
laws are only chimeras still more feeble than the law of nature.”33 Kant followed Rousseau 
closely in all this, citing St-Pierre’s and Rousseau’s plans at 8:24 and 8:313, and adding that 
every state ought to be republican. But he also went a step further by annexing a new category of 
cosmopolitan right to solve a third Hobbesian problem concerning the state of nature remaining, 
even with a federation, among states and non-state actors, refiguring the sort of right to “make 
offers” (anbieten) of commerce found in Vattel no longer as an imperfect duty in some 
freestanding law of international society but as a distinctive solution to the problem of ius 
controversum and the conflict it invites. Unsurprisingly, Kant showed no interest in the 
conventionalist line of thought associated with Leibniz (apart from the jokes). 
The long history of the ius gentium illustrates three key points, then, for understanding 
Kant. First, the point of his ius cosmopoliticum was not to extend new rights to individuals or 
non-state peoples, but to reinterpret familiar rights on a new basis. Second, in this he joined a 
debate that had opened in the early modern period over how to reconstruct the authority of law, 
both inside and outside states, once claims to universal jurisdiction of Church and Empire had 
broken down. And third, in this debate the exact definition of the law of nations, and its relation 
to both natural and civil law, became increasingly tied to competing claims about the sources of 
law and sorts of argumentative strategies to justify it. The key is to see that, because Kant’s 
intervention needed to succeed simultaneously on all these levels, any viable interpretation of his 
right of hospitality must fit into a textually plausible account of his larger strategy for 
systematically re-establishing the claim of both domestic and international law to bind, in the 
absence of any lord or all the world. 
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Kant’s Right of Hospitality 
Kant’s right of hospitality, then, was not new, but a reformulation of a central ius gentium 
right in debates over colonial wars running from Vitoria to Vattel. Vitoria and Grotius, inter alia, 
had argued that when non-state peoples reject trade with Europeans, they violate a sacred right of 
hospitality, committing an injury (iniuria) or harm (laesio) that entitles Europeans to vindicate 
their right by force. This had licensed plunder and conquest, since according to the tradition, one 
has the right to seize enemies’ lands and to reduce enemies to the status of subjects or even 
slaves, insofar as needed to compensate an injury or secure against future threats.34 Others, 
including Vattel, redefined hospitality explicitly to rule out this sort of aggression.35 Kant’s 
version followed Vattel in this, but for Kant it also served as the final piece of a response to 
Hobbes’ demand to seek peace as the condition of justice—as a way of defining an alternative to 
the state of nature, even where there were no states. Stopping wars with non-state peoples was 
important for its own sake, but also because they threatened the possibility of durable peace 
among European powers, and so also the rights of every citizen of states, which are ultimately 
only as secure as the international order (8:360, 6:311, 6:353). Kant’s argument was less 
elliptical in his drafts for Perpetual Peace than in the published texts. There he set the problem in 
the Latin terms elsewhere attributed uniquely to Hobbes: “exeundum esse e statu naturali” 
(23:157), and he explained how cosmopolitan right completes a solution by removing 
justifications for war both abroad and back in Europe: 
The principles of the supposed justice of acquiring newly discovered lands, taken for 
barbaric or unbelieving, as ownerless goods without the authorization of the inhabitants 
and even by subjugating them, are every one absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan rights 
limited to mere hospitality; and because Europe is the part of the world that sets itself 
wholly into mutual commerce… the spark of an injury to human right having fallen even 
in another part of the world, because of the flammability of the material of imperiousness 
in human nature, and above all in its leaders, the flame of war easily spreads to the region 
from which it received its source. (23:174-5)   
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The key is to see that Kant defined hospitality not as a right to demand anything—which 
might be used to justify retaliation if the demand were refused—but instead as a right that certain 
acts not be considered acts of war, that traders might arrive on foreign shores with offers of 
commerce “without it therefore being justified to meet them as an enemy” [ohne das der 
Auswärtige ihm darum als einem Feind zu begegnen berechtigt wäre] (6:352, cf. 8:358). This is 
a very strange way to phrase this right if it is meant as a positive claim to welfare for refugees or 
to unimpeded communication or to anything else, but it makes perfect sense if the point is to 
stake out a position on the just grounds for war. This is even clearer when one compares the 
similar language of Schulin’s Vattel, which frames the argument expressly as one of just war 
theory.36 It also explains why the bulk of Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitan right focused on 
colonial wars (rather than other issues, perhaps with more obvious contemporary relevance, 
frequently emphasized in the literature). 
Kant’s right of hospitality can respond to the problem of right in controversy because, 
since it is only a right not to be met with war in response to certain acts, it follows that any 
violation of the right is already war, and therefore that no alleged violation could ever be used 
justify the outbreak of a war not already underway. Kant was not concerned with determining 
whose cause in an ongoing war is “just,” but to the contrary with escaping the state of nature by 
ruling out punitive wars of every sort—deriving principles of ius ad bellum, in bello and post 
bellum strictly from the conditions of the general and permanent peace prerequisite to 
peremptory justice (6:346-9). What Kant needed was a principle that would describe a condition 
in which right need not be pursued through war, because it provides another way of resolving 
conflicts that arise in the state of nature over whether the arrival of foreign traders represents a 
trespass against the property rights of non-state peoples and hence whether or not the traders may 
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forcibly be turned away. In another case, one would solve this by forcing the people without a 
state to join one, but here Kant ruled this out because the right to coerce others into a civil 
condition derives from the hindrance they pose to one’s own freedom only where interaction is 
necessary, whereas in this case the traders have voluntarily created the potential for conflict by 
showing up uninvited, and could remove it by leaving (6:266, 6:353). So here public 
enforcement is impossible, and private enforcement is just what leads to conflict in the state of 
nature. The remaining possibility is no enforcement at all, and that is why a right like Kant’s 
hospitality, carefully framed so as never to furnish a brief for initiating war in the name of 
enforcing one’s rights, can count as a second-order principle of public law, functionally 
analogous to the state and the pacific federation in providing a solution to the problem of 
controversy over first-order private right. 
It will be supposed that leaving the state of nature requires enforcement rather than non-
enforcement, but this cannot be Kant’s view. Consider that the parallel institution in Völkerrecht, 
the voluntary federation of free states, is also explicitly unenforceable (8:356, 6:344, 6:351). 
States may fail to join up, or subsequently to respect arbitration or fulfill their duties of mutual 
defense. But Kant insists (at least by his final and most systematic political works of the 1790s) 
that the federation must be voluntary, force being reserved for defense against external powers 
who remain in a state of nature with respect to it. The point of ideas like this for Kant is practical 
or regulative: they are meant to provide a standard for judging present action because any act 
that contradicts them in principle can never be defended as just.37 No such idea secures its own 
empirical enforcement or resolves disputes over its own interpretation. (Indeed, this is true even 
of the idea of a republican constitution, which is meant to guide action but must not be imposed 
by violent revolution.) What it does is provide a principle which, if honored, describes a 
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condition of peace in which controversy over right no longer gives rise to war. One way of doing 
that is through a sovereign state, but it is not the only way. The three levels of public right simply 
lay out three different ways of solving Hobbes’ problem, not all of which Hobbes himself had 
accepted. Kant adapted the second way from Rousseau, and the third, I have suggested, from 
Vattel. 
This interpretation resolves key textual puzzles. First, it explains Kant’s insistence on 
limiting cosmopolitan right to hospitality alone. Even commentators who have noticed this have 
trouble explaining why Kant’s argument should require it. But my view makes this clear: any 
additional right—at least any positive right not phrased in the same careful way as Kant’s own—
would reintroduce the controversy over justice characteristic of the state of nature that 
cosmopolitan right is designed to escape. Second, my account explains why Kant nowhere 
considers how cosmopolitan right might be enforced, a point that has puzzled interpreters and 
which is particularly striking because Kant’s central argument in both Staatsrecht and 
Völkerrecht turned on just this problem, which he chided Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel for 
ignoring. It cannot be, as is sometimes suggested, that either states or the pacific federation were 
meant to enforce cosmopolitan right, since states recreate an international state of nature 
whenever they try to enforce justice beyond their borders; and the federation is explicitly only 
voluntary and defensive, so clearly lacking any public authority over non-members. Kant’s 
silence on the issue only makes sense if cosmopolitan right was designed, as I have argued, never 
to need enforcing.  
Against all this will be cited the famous passages at 6:352 and 8:358 where Kant appears 
to suggest that the right to hospitality derives directly from original common ownership of the 
earth. But this was a commonplace in the tradition, which Kant made a point of reworking on a 
	 23	
new basis as merely hypothetical (6:251, 6:262). Crucially, in the Metaphysics of Morals original 
common ownership was introduced first in private right, from which Kant drew the emphatic 
and unorthodox conclusion that the unilateral original acquisition it explains gives rise to 
controversy and hence the need to leave the state of nature (6:256-67). But that means it cannot 
possibly be the same ownership right that returns in the final stage of public right, this time as a 
direct and independent foundation for hospitality, because that could only reintroduce the 
controversy, whereas what is needed is a solution to it (as in the state and federation). For 
Vitoria, by contrast, original common ownership had been a historical fact before a universally 
authoritative will divided property after the flood; for Vattel the earth was given by God to all for 
their subsistence, but was later justifiably divided because growing population meant that only 
more efficient private cultivation could continue to satisfy that purpose—and for both this 
division left in place a residual right of commerce or hospitality.38 The debate Kant was engaging 
was over whether or not that right justified war. We have seen that Vitoria and Vattel disagreed, 
and the key to understanding the role of original common ownership for Kant is to see how and 
why he used it to support an answer different from either of theirs. 
Others will object citing Kant’s suggestion in Perpetual Peace that cosmopolitan right 
follows from the “spirit of commerce”. But this is not part of its justification, only a 
(characteristically Kantian) subsidiary argument meant to show that justice does not demand the 
impossible by contravening nature, and is not therefore chimerical (8:368, cf. 6:354-5). That is 
why this appears in the section on “the guarantee of perpetual peace” and needn’t reappear in the 
Doctrine of Right. 
Compare my account, finally, to others in the recent literature. Ripstein has sought to 
ground hospitality in Kant’s suggestion that all individuals have a right “to be wherever nature or 
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chance (apart from their will) has placed them” (6:262), but as Niesen points out, this cannot 
explain most of Kant’s cases, which involve traders precisely “when neither nature nor chance 
but just [their] own will” has brought them into contact with another people (6:266).39 Ripstein 
also argues that outsiders must treat ostensibly non-state peoples “as if” already in a rightful 
condition (a state), even though they may not be.40 But as Stilz notes, this fits neither Kant’s text 
nor the logic of his argument, which already precludes forcible assimilation wherever interaction 
is merely facultative and, one might add, includes contract and property rights already in the 
state of nature.41 Kleingeld accepts Ripstein’s first ground and adds a second in the innate 
individual right to the freedom to communicate one’s thoughts.42 But even together these cannot 
explain what distinguishes cosmopolitan right as public from the private rights of individuals 
already in the state of nature. And Kleingeld concedes that Ripstein’s first ground appears to 
conflict with Kant’s account of property rights. Stilz helpfully explains how provisional rights of 
first possession in the state of nature constrain interactions with non-state peoples, but she does 
not distinguish this from cosmopolitan right and hospitality, which for Kant are part not of 
private right but of the second-order public right overlaid on it to escape the controversy to 
which private right gives rise.43 Niesen, drawing on Flikschuh, has argued that cosmopolitan 
right derives from obligations we take on in unilaterally appropriating part of the earth, since 
such acts exclude others and thus are held to require transition to a cosmopolitan condition in 
which they might be retroactively sanctioned (or historical injustices made good) by a global 
omnilateral will.44 But that is Kant’s argument for the state, not for cosmopolitan right, which for 
Kant requires not a global state (as that argument would suggest), but hospitality in relations with 
peoples remaining outside any state at all. Indeed, Kant insists on the disanalogy by claiming that 
one may not force non-state peoples into states if interaction with them is facultative rather than 
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necessary. Muthu, like Niesen, rightly emphasizes Kant’s rejection of colonialism in 
cosmopolitan right, but he grounds this in human sociability, whereas I have argued this was 
Vattel’s position that Kant rejected, for reasons he took from Hobbes.45 Despite their differences, 
these interpretations all presume that cosmopolitan right needs a positive and independent 
ground. None considers the alternative for which I have argued—that it might be justified instead 
because it provides the third and final piece of a solution to the problem of right in controversy. 
And yet this must be the correct reading, because positive grounds are just what generate 
controversy in the state of nature, whereas public right is supposed to leave behind that “state 
devoid of justice” by resolving the controversy and bringing peace. 
Conclusion 
If I am correct, then Kant’s argument for a single cosmopolitan right of hospitality 
follows from a critique of a familiar sort of direct appeal to human rights or laws of reason that 
ignores the core political problem of authority in legislation, interpretation and enforcement. But 
that does not mean that beyond state borders reigns only war and never justice. To the contrary, 
Kant offers a sophisticated defense of a very narrow interpretation of cosmopolitan right, one 
that is not vulnerable to the skeptical attacks that bedevil more familiar views just because it 
insists, like Hobbes, on solving the skeptical problem on that problem’s own terms. Kant’s right 
of hospitality introduces a novel sort of right designed just so as never to be enforceable, to fill 
space that might otherwise be occupied by positive rights inviting controversy and strife, in 
contexts where the option of enforcement is off the table. His position thus asks us to consider 
whether sometimes pursuing global justice may require not more rights and duties beyond 
borders but fewer. And he makes a powerful and provocative case that peace can only serve 
justice if justice is first willing to serve peace. 
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